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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Disability is a natural part of the human experience and in no 
way diminishes the right of individuals to participate in or contribute to 
society.”1  Federal law requires public schools to provide students with 
disabilities a free and appropriate education.2  Congress established the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) to promote 
                                                 
1 20 U.S.C.S. § 1400(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2012).  
2 Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 2015). 
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equality in the education system where “the educational needs of 
millions of children with disabilities were not being fully met . . . .”3 
Complimenting IDEA, Congress implemented federal education 
funding available “on the states’ provision of a ‘free appropriate public 
education,’” (“FAPE”) to improve the educational results for children 
with disabilities.4  Unfortunately, Congress has not established a 
meaningful way to measure progress under FAPE.5 In Endrew, the 
“parents of an autistic child withdrew him from the Douglas County 
School District because they believed his educational progress was 
inadequate.”6  
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Endrew F., hereafter referred to as Drew, is a child with autism.7  
“Drew’s autism affects his cognitive functioning, language and reading 
skills, and his social and adaptive abilities.”8  Drew’s parents placed him 
in public school where he received special-education services through 
fourth grade.9  IDEA requires public schools to create a document called 
an individualized education program (“IEP”) for each student with 
disabilities.10  An IEP describes the student’s goals and establishes a 
                                                 
3 20 U.S.C.S. § 1400(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2012). 
4 Id. at § 1400(c)(3).  
5 Endrew, 798 F.3d at 1332. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 1333. 
8 Id. at 1332. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 1334. 
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plan for achieving those goals.11  Unfortunately for Drew the program 
content is left to the discretion of the local educators and parents.12 
Unsatisfied with his progress, Drew’s parents withdrew him 
from the Douglas County School District (“District”).13  Drew’s parents 
noticed Drew was not progressing in the District and consequently 
opposed the fifth grade IEP the District proposed for Drew.14  After 
rejecting the IEP, Drew’s parents enrolled him at a private school that 
specializes in educating autistic children.15  Drew’s parents believe they 
are entitled to reimbursement under law because Drew did not receive a 
FAPE.16  Parents of students with intellectual disabilities remove their 
child at their own financial risk unless they can prove both that the 
District violated IDEA17 and that the private school satisfied IDEA. 18 
One issue is how to decide if a child has received “some educational 
benefit”19 as FAPE requires.20  
 
 
                                                 
11 Id.  at 1332 (quoting Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Elizabeth E. ex rel. Roxanne 
B., 702 F.3d 1227, 1230 (10th Cir. 2012)). 
12 Endrew, 798 F.3d at 1332 (quoting Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P. ex rel. 
Jeff P., 540 F.3d 1143 1151 (10th Cir. 2008)). 
13 Endrew, 798 F.3d at 1332. 
14 Id. at 1333. 
15 Id.  
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Endrew, 798 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Florence Cty Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter by & 
Through Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993)).  
19 Endrew, 798 F.3d at 1333.  
20 Id. 
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III. TENTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 
Unfortunately for Drew and other students with disabilities in 
the area, the Tenth Circuit did not require a FAPE to result in 
“meaningful benefit”21 for the students, but required them simply to 
show “some educational benefit.”22  Drew’s parents asserted that Drew 
did not receive a FAPE.23  To determine the validity of the allegations, 
the Tenth Circuit assessed Drew’s FAPE by examining progress 
reporting, behavioral assessment, and substantive challenges.24  
First, Drew’s parents argued they could not participate in Drew’s 
education due to the District’s inadequate reporting.25  The District 
allowed these allegations and granted that the report was conclusory and 
lacked detail.26  Despite some concessions the District asserted it did not 
hinder the parents’ involvement in Drew’s education.27  The District 
produced evidence of Drew’s parents’ involvement.28  The court found 
progress reporting to be sufficient under FAPE since Drew’s parents 
regularly communicated with Drew’s teachers through face-to-face 
meetings and a back-and-forth notebook.29  The Tenth Circuit was 
                                                 
21 Id. 
22 Id. (quoting Florence Cty., 510 U.S. at 15). 
23 Endrew, 798 F.3d at 1333. 
24 Id. at 1334–43.  
25 Id. at 1335. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 1335.  
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ultimately convinced that the District abided by the IDEA regulations 
by the school’s active suggestions on modifying Drew’s IEP.30 
Second, Drew’s parents alleged that Drew’s escalating 
behavioral problems forced them to place him in the private school.31 
Drew’s behaviors included hitting things,32 removing his clothes,33 and 
going to the bathroom on the floor in class.34  The school implemented 
behavioral plans to manage and reduce Drew’s behaviors.35  The school 
maintained regular contact with Drew’s parents regarding his 
behavior.36  The Tenth Circuit found that while Drew’s behavior 
problems were escalating, the school’s efforts were sufficient.37  The 
school addressed the issues, attempted to manage Drew’s behaviors38 
and scheduled to formulate a new behavioral plan for Drew.39  The court 
noted that behavioral intervention plans are typically only necessary for 
students who require disciplinary action.40  The Tenth Circuit found the 
District did not violate IDEA or its regulations.41  The court emphasized 
                                                 
30 Id. at 1335–36. 
31 Id. at 1337. 
32 Id. at 1336. 
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 1336. 
35 Id. at 1336. 
36 Id.  
37 Id. at 1337. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 1337–38. See also Park Hill Sch. Dist. V. Dass, 655 F.3d 762, 766 (8th Cir. 
2011); Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 1825 (1st Cir. 
2008); Alex R. ex rel. Beth R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. #221, 375 
F.3d 603, 614 (7th Cir. 2004). 
41 Endrew, 798 F.3d at 1337.  
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the District fulfilled its low expectation to consider positive behavioral 
interventions.42  The Tenth Circuit held the District complied with 
federal law with regards to the behavioral assessment.43 
Lastly, Drew’s parents claimed Drew’s fifth-grade IEP was 
materially similar to Drew’s past unsuccessful IEPs.  Drew’s parents 
asserted that Drew’s lack of progress proved that the IEP was not 
“reasonably calculated to provide Drew educational benefit.”44  Drew’s 
parents also alleged that the District should have considered Drew’s 
behaviors in assessing the validity of his IEP.45 
The cornerstone issue in this case is the standard of educational 
benefit required in IDEA.  In Rowley, the Supreme Court attempted to 
resolve legislative intent for specialized education and determined the 
statute “cannot be read as imposing any particular substantive 
educational standard upon the States.”46  The Court highlighted 
Congress’s intent to simply “provide [handicapped children] with 
access to a free public education.”47  The Court emphasized FAPE’s 
requirement as “some educational benefit upon the handicapped 
child.”48  The Court continued that a “grading and advancement system 
                                                 
42 Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C.S. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i) (LexisNexis 2012)). 
43 Endrew, 798 F.3d at 1338; see R.P. ex rel. R.P. v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 703 F.3d 801, 813 (5th Cir. 2012). 
44 Endrew, 798 F.3d at 1338. 
45 Id.  
46 Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982). 
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
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[] constitutes an important factor in determining educational benefit.”49 
The Court did not provide mechanisms for measuring educational 
benefit.50  In recent years “several circuits have adopted a higher 
standard” which requires a “meaningful educational benefit.”51 
The Tenth Circuit held that it did not have the authority to 
deviate from its “well-established definition of a FAPE.”52  The Tenth 
Circuit held that Drew was receiving “some educational benefit”53 and 
Drew’s parents were not entitled to compensation.54 
IV. WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
While the Rowley court’s standard of “some educational benefit”55 
seemed inadequate, the Tenth Circuit was bound by that standard.56  The 
Tenth Circuit had a “well-established definition of a FAPE” because of 
numerous cases that dealt with this issue.  The educational benefit 
standard is becoming more rigorous in the Third and Fifth Circuits.57 
This growing rigor suggested the Supreme Court would overturn the 
Tenth Circuit’s decision in Endrew to harmonize the standard among 
                                                 
49 Id. at 203. 
50 Id.  
51 Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1339 (10th Cir. 2015); 
see, e.g., Deal v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. Of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 862 (6th Cir. 2004); 
Adam J. ex. Rel. Robert J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 804, 808–09 (5th Cir. 
2003); Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 
1988). 
52 Endrew, 798 F.3d at 1340. 
53 Id. at 1341. 
54 Id. at 1342.  
55 Id. at 200. 
56 Id.  at 1340. 
57 Id. 
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the circuits.58  Thus, the Court granted certiorari59 and unanimously 
vacated the Tenth Circuit decision.60 
V. SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS 
Through the Endrew decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
goals of IDEA.61  The Court emphasized that for schools to meet the 
standards for FAPE, the “school must offer an [IEP that is] reasonably 
calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the 
child’s circumstances.”62  The Court focused on (a) the need for higher 
standard IEPs and (b) the importance of tailored IEPs.63 
A. The Court concluded the Tenth Circuit misinterpreted Rowley and  
erred in applying the de minimus standard.64 
The Court both stressed that the Tenth Circuit erroneously relied 
upon isolated statements in Rowley and distinguished the circumstances 
in Rowley.65  The Court explained that in Rowley, although the student 
had impaired hearing, she had progressed from grade to grade.66  In 
Rowley, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that an 
“education was not ‘appropriate’ unless it provided . . . an opportunity 
to achieve full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to 
                                                 
58 Id. 
59 Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S.Ct 988, 997 (2017). 
60 Id. at 993, 1002. 
61 Id. at 991. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 992 
64 Id. at 992. 
65 Id. at 994. 
66 Id. at 995. 
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other children.”67  However, the Court in Rowley found that because the 
student made excellent progress and excelled in her specialized 
instruction, her IEP met the requirements under FAPE.68  The Court in 
Endrew stressed that the Court in Rowley did not establish a test for 
“adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered 
by [IDEA].”69  Also, the Court in Endrew agreed the district court gave 
undue weight to the Rowley language “concerning the requirement that 
States provide instruction calculated to ‘confer some educational 
benefit.’”70  
Further the Endrew Court stated a de minimus progress standard 
would defeat the purpose of offering an education to students with 
disabilities.71  Under IDEA, the child’s progress must be “appropriate 
in light of the child’s circumstances.72  
B. The Supreme Court affirmed each IEP should be tailored to the 
targeted child.73 
The IEP procedures encourage parents to work with teachers to 
“consider[] the child’s individual circumstances” and best serve the 
child.74  The IEP standards require instruction to be “specially designed” 
                                                 
67 Id. at 995 (quoting Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 185–87 (1982)). 
68 Id. at 996. 
69 Id. at 997 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202). 
70 Id. at 998 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200). 
71 Id. at 1001. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 992. 
74 Id. at 994 (quoting 20 U.S.C.S. § 1414 (LexisNexis 2012)). 
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to meet a child’s “unique needs.”75  The Rowley Court illustrated the 
“infinite variations” of IEP possible under the IDEA requirements.76  In 
Endrew, the Court illustrated that while in the public-school system, 
Drew would scream, run away, and be fearful of “commonplace things 
like flies, spills, and public restrooms,”77 in Firefly Autism House, “a 
private school that specializes in educating children with autism,”78 his 
“behavior improved significantly.”79  Since Drew made meaningful 
progress at Firefly, the Court concluded due to his stagnancy in the 
public school system, his IEP was ineffective precluding Drew from 
receiving his guaranteed FAPE.80  
Tailoring an IEP to each child’s particular circumstances is 
paramount and foundational under FAPE.81  Since the Endrew decision 
applies the same FAPE standards, the decision is not “plainly at odds” 
with any standards adopted in Rowley, thus IEPs must be analyzed on a 
case-by-case basis.82 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 Id. at 999.  
76 Id. (quoting Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982)). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 996. 
79 Id. at 997. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. at 999–1000. 
82 Id. at 1001. 
2018]            CLARIFYING PUBLIC EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS               123 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Endrew was decided March 22, 2017 and has impacted most 
circuits.83  Since several jurisdictions, like the Tenth Circuit, had 
misinterpreted Rowley and overemphasized Rowley’s “some material 
benefits” language, the Endrew decision will affirm the meaningful 
benefit standard. 84  This updated standard will require educators who 
establish IEPs to ensure each is “reasonably calculated to enable the 
child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.”85 
School authorities continue to have deference in the IEP process since 
the IEP mandates communications between the parents and the 
educators.86 
Although this heightened standard may require more time and 
energy for educators, ensuring meaningful progress will realign the 
educational system to Congress’ goals of “provid[ing] students with 
disabilities a free and appropriate education”87 and of “promot[ing] 
equality in the education system where ‘the educational needs of 
                                                 
83 United States v. Maldonado-Burgos, 869 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017); R.B. v. N.Y. City 
Dep’t of Educ., 689 Fed. Appx. 48 (2d Cir. 2017); T.M. v. Quakertown Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 251 F.Supp.3d 792 (E.D. Pa. 2017); M.L. v. Smith, 867 F.3d 487 (4th Cir. 
2017); Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Woody, 865 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. Tex. 2017); I.L. v. 
Knox Cty. Bd. of Educ., 257 F.Supp.3d 946 (E.D.Tenn. 2017); I.Z.M. v. Rosemount-
Apple Valley-Eagan Pub. Sch., 863 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2017); Rachel H. v. Dep’t of 
Educ., 868 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir.  2017); and United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 
1293 (11th Cir. 2017). 
84 Endrew, 137 S. Ct at 998. 
85 Id. at 999 (quoting Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203–204 (1982)).   
86 Id. at 1001. 
87 Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 2015). 
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millions of children with disabilities were not being fully met . . . .’”88  
Guaranteed free and public education is foundational in our country.  
Thus, the Endrew decision will likely have a positive impact across 
circuits and within schools.  
 
                                                 
88 20 U.S.C.S. § 1400(c)(2) (2012). 
